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Siderits: Celebrities’ Expansive “Right of Publicity”

Celebrities’ Expansive “Right of Publicity” Infringes upon Advertisers’ First Amendment Rights
By: Jonathan Siderits
I. Introduction
In April 2014, television and movie actress Katherine Heigl was photographed by
paparazzi as she exited a Duane Reade drugstore in downtown New York, shopping bags in
hand.1 The company seized the opportunity to promote its brand by publishing the photograph on
its Twitter and Facebook accounts, each captioned with “Love a quick #DuaneReade run? Even
@KatieHeigl can't resist shopping #NYC's favorite [most convenient] drugstore.”2 Heigl
responded in a manner that Duane Reade likely did not expect—she sued the company for,
among other things, violating her right of publicity under New York state law, seeking damages
of no less than $6 million.3
In her complaint, Heigl expressed her strenuous objection to Duane Reade “exploit[ing]
[her] image for commercial gain,” claiming that she had suffered “substantial” harm.4 In
particular, Heigl asserted that her “picture, image, and likeness enjoy wide-spread recognition
and monetary value” by virtue of her celebrity status, and that she has carefully protected her
name and persona from unauthorized exploitation by advertisers.5 As she puts it, “when [she]
chooses to endorse a product or service, she is highly selective and well compensated.”6 Duane

Emily Yahr, Can Katherine Heigl really sue Duane Reade for tweeting her photo? Yes, and here’s why., The
Washington Post (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/wp/2014/04/11/can-katherineheigl-really-sue-duane-reade-for-tweeting-her-photo-yes-and-heres-why/.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Heigl v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02502 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), ECF No. 2, Complaint at 1.
5
Id. at 4.
6
Id. at 4.
1
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Reade, however, had not sought or obtained her permission prior to publishing the photograph to
promote its stores.7
Although Heigl v. Duane Reade, Inc. was ultimately settled out of court in August 2014,
with Duane Reade allegedly making a sizable contribution to Heigl’s charity foundation, the case
illustrates the expansive nature of celebrities’ so-called “right of publicity” and its impact on the
First Amendment rights of advertisers, as well as its effect on the general public.8 The right of
publicity should not be a viable cause of action against an advertiser who uses a celebrity's name
or likeness, or otherwise appropriates the celebrity’s identity to promote a product, so long as the
advertiser does not falsely imply that the celebrity approves of, or endorses, the product.
II. Background
A. Regulation of Commercial Speech
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council criticized the paternalistic, overprotective nature of the commercial speech
doctrine.9 Prior to Virginia State Board, the commercial speech doctrine had allowed practically
unbridled legislative regulation of commercial speech, which was viewed as having little value
with little or no recognition of any First Amendment protection, since the days of Valentine v.
Chrestensen.10 But now, the Supreme Court has recognized that different people value different
speech differently, and that consumers and society in general have a strong interest in the “free

7

Id. at 10.
Nate Raymond, Katherine Heigl, Duane Reade end lawsuit over actress' photo, Reuters (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/27/us-people-katherineheigl-idUSKBN0GR2BD20140827.
9
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
10
See e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that, while states and municipalities may not
unduly burden or proscribe the freedom to communicate information in public thoroughfares, “the Constitution
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”).
8
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flow of commercial information.”11 And, as Justice Blackmun stated in the majority opinion, the
right to free speech is just as much about the “listener” as it is about the “speaker.”12
Following Virginia State Board, in 1980 the Supreme Court decided the landmark
commercial speech case Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. New York, which established
the modern standard for government regulation of speech in the context of commercial
advertising. Finding that commercial speech was valuable as a means of providing information to
people to make informed decisions, the Court established a four-step analysis which asks: (1) is
the expression protected by the First Amendment (i.e. concerning lawful activity and not
misleading); (2) is the asserted governmental interest substantial; (3) does the regulation directly
advance the asserted governmental interest; and (4) is the regulation more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest?13 Essentially, a state can only regulate lawful commercial speech
if it has a substantial interest for doing so and the regulation directly advances that interest in a
manner no more extensive than necessary.14 In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun disagreed
with the last three prongs of the Court’s new test, and instead believed the first prong to be
dispositive; in his view, so long as the speech was lawful and not misleading, then the
government’s only recourse might be to regulate the advertised product or service itself—not the
commercial speech associated therewith.15

11

Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763-764.
Id. at 757.
13
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
14
Id.
15
See id. at 579.
12
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B. Haelan Laboratories
The right of publicity was first recognized by the Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. In Haelan, the court decided that “a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture.”16 According to the Haelan court, this “right of publicity” must be separate from the
statute-created right of privacy, wherein one has “a personal and non-assignable right not to have
his feelings hurt” by a publication of his own picture, because, as the court reasoned, celebrities
would otherwise “feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements.”17 Indeed, the Haelan court recognized that this sense of deprivation would be
“far from” any sense of bruised feelings on the part of the celebrity.18 In essence, the Haelan
court recognized that there is pecuniary value in a person’s (and, in particular, a celebrity’s)
endorsement of a product or service, and therefore created a new, common-law, intellectual
property right for courts to protect that value. Notably, the emersion of the right of publicity
occurred during the reign of the commercial speech doctrine, prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Virginia State Board or its creation of the Central Hudson test.
C. Celebrity Impersonators
In the half-century since Haelan, the right of publicity has been recognized in the
majority of states across the country, either by way of common law or codification in state
statute.19 Moreover, the right has undergone significant expansion in the advertising context,

16

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
Id.
18
Id.
19
Notably, national advertisers must adhere to the strictest of the state laws in which they advertise, such that
recognition of the right of publicity in the majority of states has the practical result of affecting advertisers’
decisions even in states where the right is not recognized.
17
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reaching far beyond the use of a celebrity’s picture. For example, in Onassis v. Christian DiorNew York, Inc., the court found that the New York right of publicity statute, which prohibited
unauthorized appropriation of a person’s “portrait or picture” for advertising purposes, was
violated by use of a celebrity “look-alike.”20 In Onassis, an advertiser sought to prepare a
number of print ads featuring the famous Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, but knew that she would
likely refuse to appear because she was historically known to never allow her name or image to
be used to promote commercial products; the advertiser’s solution was to fill her role in the ad
with the help of Barbara Reynolds, a celebrity impersonator of Onassis.21 The court ruled against
the advertiser, holding that the statutory language “portrait or picture” extended beyond actual
images of Onassis herself to include “any representation, including the picture of another, which
was intended to be, and did, in fact, convey the idea that it was the plaintiff.”22 The court
concluded that Reynolds may not use her resemblance to Onassis in commercial advertisements,
adding that “[n]o one has an inherent or constitutional right to pass himself off for what he is
not.”23
Shortly after the New York Supreme Court’s decision in Onassis, the Southern District of
New York decided a similar case involving another celebrity look-alike. In Allen v. National
Video, Inc., the court clarified that, in analyzing a right of publicity claim against the use of a
celebrity look-alike, “the question before the court is not whether some, or even most, people
will be reminded of plaintiff when they see this advertisement . . . but whether an undisputed
picture of [the look-alike] should be regarded, as a matter of law, to be a portrait or picture of

20

Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257-258, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1984) aff'd, 488 N.Y.S.2d
943 (App. Div. 1985).
21
Id. at 257.
22
Id. at 261.
23
Id. at 262.
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plaintiff.”24 While it found that the advertisement at issue, which included a photograph of
Woody Allen look-alike Phil Boroff, certainly made reference to the celebrity plaintiff, the court
identified several factors that weighed against granting summary judgment in his favor.25 These
factors included several differing physical characteristics and alternative interpretations for the
look-alike’s presence in the advertisement, and so the court declined to conclude that the
photograph used in the advertisement was the celebrity’s portrait or picture as a matter of law.26
Therefore, the court resolved the issue in the context of a Lanham Act false endorsement claim
instead, ultimately finding in favor of the celebrity plaintiff and granting an injunction against
the defendant advertiser.27
Similarly, in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., an advertising agency sought out Grammy
Award winner Bette Midler to sing her hit “Do You Want To Dance” for a television commercial
promoting the Ford Lincoln Mercury.28 When Midler’s manager refused, the agency found a
replacement in Ula Hedwig, a former Midler backup singer.29 After being instructed by the
agency to record the song “sound[ing] as much as possible like…Bette Midler,” Hedwig imitated
Midler as best she could.30 Ultimately, the Hedwig recording was used in the commercial, and
many viewers believed that it “sounded exactly” like Midler’s distinctive recording.31 Even
though the court found that the agency had not used Midler’s name, voice, likeness, or any other
use prohibited by state statute, the court looked to the common law, wherein the state would

24

Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (emphases in original).
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 630.
28
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 462.
25

http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/4

6

Siderits: Celebrities’ Expansive “Right of Publicity”

recognize an injury from “an appropriation of the attributes of one’s identity.”32 The court found
that using Hedwig as a Midler “sound-alike” constituted such an appropriation, stating that “[t]o
impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity.”33
D. Right of Publicity vs. First Amendment
Celebrities’ right of publicity has occasionally been trumped by the First Amendment.
For example, in C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., the
court recognized “an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of
expression under the First Amendment.”34 The C.B.C. court balanced the competing interests at
issue in a non-advertising setting: a fantasy sports game producer’s First Amendment right to use
baseball players’ names and playing records versus the baseball players’ right of publicity.35 In
conducting its analysis, the court identified each of the potential justifications for enforcing the
right of publicity. First, the court noted that, in Zacchini v. Scripps, the Supreme Court had found
that at least one goal of the right is to “focus [] on the right of the individual to reap the reward of
his endeavors,” distinguishing between those cases in which a person’s name is used “for
purposes of trade” and those which “go[] to the heart of [a person’s] ability to earn a living” and
which involve “the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first
place.”36 The C.B.C. court found that the game producer’s use of the players’ names and playing

32

Id. at 463.
Id.
34
C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1095
(E.D. Mo. 2006) aff'd, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 1097 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting, Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)).
33
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records did not interfere with their ability to reap financial rewards from playing baseball and
making product endorsements.37
Next, the C.B.C. court analyzed the potential economic incentive for enforcing the
players’ right of publicity. Quoting Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n38,
the court found that the economic incentive of inducing achievement was “inconsequential
because most celebrities with valuable commercial identities are already handsomely
compensated . . . even without the right of publicity the rate of return to stardom in the
entertainment and sports fields is probably high enough to bring forth a more than adequate
supply of creative effort and achievement.”39 Moreover, the court noted that “even in the absence
of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap financial reward from authorized
appearances and endorsements.”40 While the C.B.C. court clearly was not moved by this
economic incentive, it noted that another economic incentive of promoting efficient allocation of
resources might be more persuasive in an advertising context, “where repeated use of a
celebrity’s likeness to sell products may eventually diminish its commercial value.”41
The C.B.C. court also identified protection against consumer deception as a justification
for the right of publicity, but noted that the Lanham Act already provides such protection.42
Other possible justifications cited by the court included allowing the persons to enjoy the fruits
of their goodwill and the prevention of unjust enrichment.43 Notably, the court found that the
public’s countervailing “interest in the dissemination of news and information” outweighed any

37

Id.
95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir.1996).
39
C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097 (internal quotations omitted).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1098.
42
Id.
43
Id.
38
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of the baseball players’ interests.44 Specifically, the court found that the public had a substantial
interest in “factual data” concerning baseball players and games.45 Therefore, the court held that,
even if the players had a valid right of publicity in their names and records and the game
producer was infringing that right, the right of publicity “must give way” to the producer’s First
Amendment right.46
E. White v. Samsung
1. Panel Decision
Perhaps the most expansive court decision involving a right of publicity was White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. At issue in White was a television commercial by Samsung
that was designed to imply that its products would still be in use in the upcoming twenty-first
century.47 Specifically, the commercial promoted Samsung’s video-cassette recorders (VCRs)
and depicted a robot dressed similarly to “Wheel of Fortune” co-host Vanna White posing in
front of a game board in a manner similar to White.48 The game board clearly resembled the
“Wheel of Fortune” set, and the commercial’s caption read “Longest-running game show. 2012
A.D.”49 The clear takeaway from the commercial was that, by the year 2012, Vanna White
would be replaced by a robot in her role as co-host of the popular game show. White, whose
permission was neither sought nor given prior to the commercial’s airing, was not amused. After
losing to Samsung on summary judgment at the district court, White persuaded the Ninth Circuit

44

Id.
Id. at 1099.
46
Id. at 1100.
47
White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Aug. 19, 1992).
48
Id.
49
Id.
45

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2016

9

The University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Court of Appeals to allow her to take her common law right of publicity claim to a jury—
ultimately receiving a $403,000 award.50
In reversing the district court’s dismissal of White’s right of publicity claim, the Ninth
Circuit declared that the common law right of publicity is not confined to appropriation of a
person’s “name or likeness.”51 Rather, the court found that common law right of publicity
protects a person’s “identity” in a broad sense, citing Midler, among others.52 In the court’s view,
the only question is whether a defendant has appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, not how he has
done so.53 And, in White’s case, the Samsung commercial left “little doubt about the celebrity
the ad is meant to depict.”54 For the Ninth Circuit panel, this was enough for White to allege that
Samsung had appropriated her identity. Moreover, the majority dismissed Samsung’s parody
defense simply because the advertisement’s primary message was commercial in nature.55
Notably, Circuit Judge Alarcon dissented from the majority’s conclusion that recovery
under right of publicity is allowable merely if there is an appropriation of one’s identity.
Specifically, Alarcon found that the authoritative cases all required proof of appropriation of a
name or likeness, and that a case may only go to a jury when “identifying characteristics unique
to a plaintiff are the only information as to the identity of the person appearing in an ad.”56
Alarcon then concluded that “[n]o reasonable juror could confuse a metal robot with Vanna
White.”57 Moreover, Alarcon pointed out that the “Wheel of Fortune” game board was the only

See Heberer, William M. III (1994) “The Overprotection of Celebrity: A Comment on White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc.,” Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 22: Iss. 3, Article 10, at 6.
51
Id. at 1397.
52
Id. at 1398.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1399.
55
Id. at 1401.
56
Id. at 1404.
57
Id.
50
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part of the commercial that could lead a viewer to think of White, and that courts had never
before granted any kind of proprietary interest to a performer in a particular role that he or she
had become famous for playing.58 Referencing copyright law, Alarcon warned of creating a
monopoly that would inhibit the creative expressions of others; as he pointed out, Samsung only
copied “the idea of a glamorous female game show hostess,” and employed its own unique
expression to portray that idea.59 Therefore, Alarcon would have affirmed the district court’s
judgment, since Samsung did not appropriate either of White’s name or likeness.
2. Kozinski’s Dissent from Refusal to Rehear En Banc
Following the unfavorable decision of the Ninth Circuit panel, Samsung petitioned the
court for a rehearing en banc. Although the petition was denied, Circuit Judge Kozinski authored
a powerful dissent that identified numerous flaws in the panel’s holding.60 Among other notable
comments, Kozinski admonished:
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity
is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since
we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by
accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came before.
Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.61
Kozinski also reiterated some of what Alarcon had said in his dissenting opinion.
Namely, that the “Wheel of Fortune” set—not the robot’s face, dress, or jewelry—is what
evoked White’s image in the commercial.62 Therefore, the right granted to White by the Ninth
Circuit panel was an exclusive right not in her image or persona, but in “what she does for a

58

Id. at 1405.
Id. at 1408.
60
White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
61
Id. at 1513.
62
Id. at 1515.
59
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living.”63 Moreover, Kozinski considered the speech restriction imposed on Samsung to be
“unparalleled” in First Amendment law, as it disallowed “reminding people of someone”—far
beyond merely protecting White’s name or likeness—and he pondered why the court would
allow White to “control our thoughts” in this manner.64 He warned that giving too much weight
to performers’ right of publicity could allow them to veto fair use parodies and derivative works
of the shows in which they appear.65
Kozinski’s dissent also attacked the panel’s dismissal of the First Amendment simply
because Samsung’s speech was commercial. Scolding the panel’s complete failure to even
mention, much less address, the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson commercial speech test,
Kozinski advised that “[c]ommercial speech may be less protected by the First Amendment than
noncommercial speech, but less protected means protected nonetheless.”66 Moreover, Kozinski
pointed out that White, like Samsung, “does whatever she does to make money, too,” and posed
the question of why White’s right to use her persona for profit should be superior to Samsung’s
right to profit off its products.67
III. Discussion
The expansive nature of the right of publicity has resulted in an encroachment upon
advertisers’ First Amendment rights. Specifically, advertisers such as Duane Reade are now
being sued for simply publishing truthful speech regarding a celebrity who actually uses the
advertised product or service, because the celebrity has not given permission and the advertiser

63

Id.
Id. at 1519.
65
Id. at 1518.
66
Id. at 1519.
67
Id. at 1517.
64
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has not given payment. However, the “value” associated with a celebrity’s name or reputation,
economic or otherwise, should not be enough to outweigh an advertiser’s First Amendment right
to truthful speech (as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment), or the public’s
interest in hearing such speech. Therefore, the right of publicity should not be a viable cause of
action against an advertiser who appropriates a celebrity’s identity to promote a product, so long
as the advertiser does not falsely imply that the celebrity endorses the product, as similarly
required for false endorsement claims under the Lanham Act.
A. Competing Interests
Taken at face value, neither of the competing interests at stake in a celebrity right of
publicity action against an advertiser seems particularly compelling. On the one hand, an
advertiser such as Duane Reade is typically seeking to capitalize on another’s success to sell a
product, and on the other hand, a very wealthy celebrity such as Katherine Heigl is usually
seeking an unimaginable sum of money; as Kozinski recognized in his White dissent, both are
looking to make money. However, the advertiser’s interest should be recognized as the more
compelling, even if only by a narrow margin. Specifically, the advertiser’s right to publish
truthful information is grounded in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; as
Kozinski also recognized, the mere fact that the advertiser’s speech is for a commercial purpose
does not wholly deprive it of all protection—it merely requires application of the Central
Hudson test. Moreover, a celebrity’s usage of a particular product may be the kind of
information that consumers want to know prior to making a purchasing decision, and therefore
ought to be part of the “free flow of commercial information” described in Virginia State Board.
This is evident from the strong influence that paid endorsers can have over audiences, and the
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high demand that they are in.68 Also, the C.B.C. court recognized the public’s interest in knowing
“factual data.” These interests all outweigh the celebrity’s right to publicity, which stems from
either state statute or state common law and, as seen in Haelan Laboratories, essentially exists
merely to protect a pecuniary interest. The only “harm” alleged by celebrities like Katherine
Heigl is strictly financial.
To properly determine whether a state has the ability to constitutionally regulate an
advertiser’s commercial speech, such as by enjoining an advertiser from publishing that a
celebrity uses its product or service, the regulation must be analyzed under the Central Hudson
test. As previously stated, this test asks: (1) is the expression protected by the First Amendment;
(2) is the asserted governmental interest substantial; (3) does the regulation directly advance the
asserted governmental interest; and (4) is the regulation more extensive than necessary to serve
that interest?
If the advertiser’s speech is truthful and accurately states that a particular celebrity uses
its product or service, then the first prong is met. For example, Katherine Heigl did not deny that
she actually shopped at Duane Reade, and so the advertisements were presumably entirely
truthful (and certainly provided strong evidential support in the form of the photographs
themselves). Notably, under Blackmun’s concurrence in Central Hudson, the analysis would be
complete at this step and the issue would be resolved in favor of the advertiser.

68

See, e.g., Kate Middleton Causes Diane Von Furstenberg Wrap Dress To Sell Out In Minutes, The Huffington
Post Canada, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/04/16/kate-middleton-diane-vonfurstenberg_n_5163893.html?just_reloaded=1; and Jamie Feldman, Rihanna Gets Paid More For Attending A
Fashion Show Than You Probably Make In One Year, The Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/21/rihanna-fashion-show-attendance-cost_n_5366775.html.
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Nevertheless, moving on to the second prong, it is difficult to identify a government
interest in a celebrity’s right of publicity action that is “substantial.” The C.B.C. court provided
some guidance for this when it identified various potential justifications for the right of publicity,
but none of those that apply to the truthful advertising context satisfy the substantial interest
requirement. For example, this is not a case where the celebrity’s ability to earn a living might be
interfered with; at most, the celebrity may suffer some loss from potential paid endorsements.
But such loss would be inconsequential for substantially the same reason that the economic
incentive of inducing achievement is irrelevant—because celebrities are already “handsomely
compensated.” Moreover, truthfully advertising that a celebrity actually uses a product or service
certainly does not create a concern of consumer deception (indeed, paid “endorsers” are more
likely to cause such deception where they do not actually use the products they are selling). The
most applicable justification identified in C.B.C. is the efficient allocation of resources to protect
the commercial value of the celebrity’s likeness. Yet the C.B.C. court also recognized that “in the
absence of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap financial reward from
authorized appearances and endorsements.”69
Therefore, while a state may still have some “legitimate” interest in providing a celebrity
with a right of publicity (under a less stringent standard), it seems highly questionable that this
interest might be considered “substantial” enough to pass muster under Central Hudson. Without
a substantial government interest, the remaining factors of Central Hudson cannot be satisfied.
Moreover, echoing Justice Blackmun’s words in Virginia State Board, the “listener” has a strong
interest in hearing the advertiser’s truthful speech. And, as C.B.C. recognized, the public has an

69

C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097 (internal quotations omitted).
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interest in the dissemination of “news and information.”70 In short, the celebrity’s interest in
reaping financial gains for supporting a product or service should not outweigh the advertiser’s
First Amendment right to free speech and the public’s interest in hearing it.
B. Right of Publicity Cases More Concerned with False Endorsement
Although characterized by the courts as “right of publicity” cases, many such cases have
really turned on whether an advertisement created a false impression that a celebrity actually
approved of, or endorsed, a particular product or service. For example, in Onassis the court
found that the celebrity look-alike was so strikingly similar to Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis that
an image of the look-alike legally constituted a “portrait or picture” of Onassis herself.
Therefore, the impression created by the advertisement was that Onassis endorsed the advertised
product—in fact, that she approved of the product so much that she was willing to lift her selfimposed ban on commercial promotions to appear in an advertisement for it. The court even
characterized the advertiser’s look-alike tactic as an attempt to find a loophole “if a person is
unwilling to give his or her endorsement to help sell a product.”71 Similarly, the Midler decision
turned on the fact that the sound-alike’s performance so closely resembled Bette Midler’s, again
creating the impression that Midler herself endorsed the product when she had in fact declined to
do so.
The court in Allen declined to decide the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim, resolving the
issue instead in the context of a Lanham Act false endorsement claim, where the same relief was
available under the less stringent standard of a “likelihood” of confusion. But before shifting its

While Katherine Heigl’s shopping habits may hardly seem to be newsworthy, it should be noted that the
photographs posted by Duane Reade were originally published by a celebrity gossip news source. See Heigl v.
Duane Reade, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02502 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), ECF No. 2.
71
Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
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analysis toward the Lanham Act, Allen clarified that the question under right of publicity is not
whether people will be “reminded” of the celebrity, but whether an image shown in the
advertisement should be regarded to “be” an image of the celebrity—in other words, whether
viewers will actually believe that the celebrity himself is endorsing the product. This was the
standard that the White court failed to apply. And, had the Kozinski and Alarcon opinions won
the day in White, Samsung would have been permitted to continue running its commercial
because it did not actually use Vanna White’s name or likeness; rather, it merely reminded
viewers of her, devoid of any suggestion that White herself actually endorsed the Samsung
products.
C. Comparison to Defamation
It is worth noting the striking incongruity between the legal standards that a celebrity
must satisfy when bringing a suit for defamation as opposed to a right of publicity infringement
suit. In the defamation context, a celebrity or other public figure may only recover if he can
prove that the defendant made a false statement about him, and that the false statement in
question was made with “actual malice.”72 Historically, this can be a difficult standard to meet,
as it requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had either actual knowledge of the falsity or
a reckless disregard for the truth.73 Notably, part of the reasoning behind applying such a
heightened standard to public figures was that they are in a better position than private
individuals to correct any falsehoods published about them by virtue of their access to the public
forum, and that publishers ought to be protected from the undue fact-checking burden that they
might otherwise endure.

72
73

See e.g., The New York Times Co. v. L.B. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-281 (1964).
Id.
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It seems strange, then, that a celebrity has a much easier case to make when suing
someone—an advertiser—for publishing something entirely truthful and not at all defamatory.
Suddenly, truthful information finds itself more heavily restricted than false information. And
yet, much of the same rationale behind the actual malice standard still applies: the celebrity still
has access to the public forum, and can correct, or at least respond to, any attempts by advertisers
to use his name or likeness to promote a product. Moreover, the right of publicity would allow
anyone else to make the same exact truthful representation about the celebrity in a nonadvertising context; it simply targets one particular group of speakers, advertisers, by virtue of
the fact that they seek to make a profit—but so does the celebrity. Furthermore, while a celebrity
might complain that he did not wish for the public to know of his use of a particular product or
service for reasons other than pecuniary interests (perhaps out of fear that such knowledge might
damage his reputation), a private individual or news outlet could be completely free to make that
knowledge public;74 such an issue might be better suited for a right of privacy claim, anyway.
IV. Conclusion
Celebrities like Katherine Heigl should not have a viable cause of action against
advertisers like Duane Reade, who simply publicize truthful events to promote their brands. A
celebrity’s right of publicity should only be considered infringed when an advertiser has
misappropriated the celebrity’s name or likeness to create a false impression that the celebrity
actually “endorses” its product or service. But when a celebrity actually does use a product, he
cannot complain over the resulting impression that he approves of that product. And, if he truly
wishes to be distanced from that product, he can find redress via his access to the public forum in
74

As previously mentioned, the Heigl photographs were already available via a celebrity gossip news source. See
Katherine Heigl Signs with WME After Leaving Creative Artists Agency, Just Jared,
http://www.justjared.com/photo-gallery/3073133/katherine-heigl-signs-with-wmeleaves-caa/02/.
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the same manner as if he had actually been defamed. Truthful information that consumers may
want to know should not be subject to restriction at the will of a celebrity’s financial interest; the
First Amendment should not give way to Katherine Heigl’s hunt for more money.
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